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NOTE
THE COMMODIFICATION OF CRYPTOCURRENCY
Neil Tiwari*
Cryptocurrencies are digital tokens built on blockchain technology. This al-
lows for a product that is fully decentralized, with no need for a third-party 
intermediary like a government or financial institution. Cryptocurrency crea-
tors use initial coin offerings (ICOs) to raise capital to build their tokens. 
Cryptocurrency ICOs are problematic because they do not fit neatly within 
either of two traditional categories—securities or commodities. Each of these 
categories has their own regulatory agency: the SEC for securities and the 
CFTC for commodities. At first blush, ICOs seem to be a sale of securities 
subject to regulation by the SEC, but this is far from clear and creates regula-
tory difficulties. This is because the Howey test, which determines whether an 
asset is a security or not, does not cleanly apply to nontraditional assets, like 
tokens. This Note argues for a revised standard that reconciles Howey with 
cryptocurrencies. This standard would require cryptocurrency creators to 
show how essential blockchain technology is to their token if they want to 
fall beyond the scope of the Howey test, and consequently SEC regulation. 
This standard would still preserve regulatory protections from fraud, which 
the CFTC provides for investors, while loosening regulatory restrictions on 
the cryptocurrencies that leverage blockchain technology most usefully. 
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Introduction
Cryptocurrencies expose a rift between the financial market regulatory 
schemes administered by the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) and by 
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). Traditionally, the 
authority of each of these two regulators has been delineated by a clearly de-
fined boundary separating securities and commodities. Bitcoin and other 
cryptocurrencies disrupt the securities/commodities dichotomy as they do 
not cleanly fit in either category. This Note examines the disruption through 
the lens of cryptocurrency initial coin offerings (ICOs). ICOs, a relatively re-
cent phenomenon, allow entrepreneurs to raise substantial amounts of capi-
tal outside the existing framework of securities laws.1 Although the SEC re-
cently announced enforcement actions against these offerings,2 reasoning 
that some cryptocurrencies are securities under the Securities Act of 1933,3
the CFTC holds that cryptocurrencies4 are commodities under the Com-
modities Exchange Act.5
The distinction between classifying cryptocurrencies as securities or 
commodities is critical. First adopted in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., the invest-
ment contract test (Howey test) establishes four requirements that determine 
1. See Jay Clayton, Statement on Cryptocurrencies and Initial Coin Offerings, U.S. SEC
(Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-clayton-2017-12-11
[https://perma.cc/EF9S-ATGL] (“I believe that initial coin offerings—whether they represent 
offerings of securities or not—can be effective ways for entrepreneurs and others to raise fund-
ing, including for innovative projects.”).
2. Cyber Enforcement Actions, U.S. SEC, https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/cybersecurity-
enforcement-actions [https://perma.cc/322T-NDEH].
3. SEC, Release No. 81207, Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: The DAO (2017), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/
investreport/34-81207.pdf [https://perma.cc/RB2T-HC6B] [hereinafter DAO Report] (“Based 
on the investigation, and under the facts presented, the Commission has determined that DAO 
Tokens are securities under the Securities Act of 1933 . . . .”); Company Halts ICO After SEC 
Raises Registration Concerns, U.S. SEC (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-
release/2017-227 [https://perma.cc/YGN9-CFNA] [hereinafter Company Halts ICO]; SEC 
Emergency Action Halts ICO Scam, U.S. SEC (Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-
release/2017-219 [https://perma.cc/NK66-CKJE].
4. When referring to cryptocurrencies generally, I will use the terms “digital token,” 
“digital coin,” “coin,” and “token” interchangeably. When referring to specific cryptocurren-
cies, like bitcoin, I will identify them by name.
5. In re Coinflip, Inc., CFTC No. 15-29, [2015–2016 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. 
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 33,583 (Sept. 17, 2015).
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whether an agreement is an investment contract and therefore a security.6
But cryptocurrencies do not neatly fit within the investment contract test.7
The test distinguishes between commodities and securities, but the novelty 
of cryptocurrency strains that distinction.8 If firms selling digital tokens to 
raise capital are found to be selling securities, they must comply with the reg-
istration requirement enforced by the SEC.9 The registration requirement 
entails disclosing an exhaustive list of items to investors that is both costly 
and time-consuming to compile and, perhaps most critically, exposes the is-
suer to fraud liability under Rule 10b-5.10 Additionally, “[t]he presence of a 
security also brings with it the monitoring and enforcement of the SEC and
possible criminal sanctions for violations of the securities laws.”11
Traditionally, commodities were distinct from securities because they 
were tangible and held inherent value.12 Typical commodities include gold, 
livestock, and wheat.13 These are nonfungible, are relatively nonmarketable, 
and require substantial care or attention.14 In contrast, securities are intangi-
ble and have no inherent value; instead, they derive their value from the ef-
forts of an enterprise.15 Put simply, compared to securities, commodities in-
dicate a higher dependence on the efforts of the seller to return a profit to the 
buyer.16
Contemporary finance has morphed these traditional commodities into 
financial instruments that can be used like securities. Commodities transac-
tions now serve “essential functions of speculation, hedging, and price dis-
6. 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946).
7. See Investor Bulletin: Initial Coin Offerings, U.S SEC (July 25, 2017), https://
www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-and-bulletins/ib_coinofferings [https://perma.cc/JEC5-
372V](“Depending on the facts and circumstances of each individual ICO, the virtual coins or 
tokens that are offered or sold may be securities.”).
8. See infra Part II.
9. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (2012) (prohibiting actions unless a 
security is registered with the SEC).
10. See Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Securities Regulation 95 (4th ed. 2015); 
see also 17 C.F.R. § 229 (2017). This section, Regulation S-K, details all of the information that 
firms must disclose about securities they hope to sell to the public. It’s a long and detailed list 
that is costly and time-consuming to compile.
11. Choi & Pritchard, supra note 10, at 95–96.
12. Alan R. Bromberg, Commodities Law and Securities Law—Overlaps and Preemp-
tions, 1 J. Corp. L. 217, 222 (1976).
13. See Andrew Verstein, Insider Trading in Commodities Markets, 102 Va. L. Rev. 447, 
447, 454 (2016) (describing how gold, copper, zinc, grain, and livestock are all commodities).
14. Differences between securities and commodities can be understood through these 
factors. Securities are fungible—Apple common stock is identical to all other Apple common 
stock. Relative marketability refers to the ability for investors to access the market because “the 
market does not deal in quantities as small as the sales in question.” Bromberg, supra note 12,
at 224. Finally, and most obviously, commodities often require care or attention, as is the case 
in agricultural commodities like wheat. Id.
15. Id. at 222.
16. Id. at 225.
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covery.”17 The principal participants in commodities markets are sophisti-
cated traders who use commodities in much the same way they use securi-
ties.18 Furthermore, the modern legal definition of a commodity is much 
more expansive than the traditional view of tangible assets with inherent 
value.19 Section 1(a)(9) of the Commodities Exchange Act defines “commod-
ity” to include “all services, rights, and interests . . . in which contracts for 
future delivery are presently or in the future dealt in.”20 This regime governs 
the largest financial markets in the world, including bets on interest rates, 
futures, swaps, and the currency exchange markets.21 Where the capacious 
definition of commodity ends and where the definition of a security begins is 
not obvious.
Cryptocurrencies occupy an unclear place in this regulatory scheme. Ac-
cording to an SEC investor bulletin, some ICO transactions are securities 
while others are not.22 But according to the CFTC, “[b]itcoin and other vir-
tual currencies are . . . properly defined as commodities.”23 As a result of this 
administrative split, an unclear rule has been established: cryptocurrencies 
that are structured like bitcoin are more likely to be commodities subject to 
regulation by the CFTC, while cryptocurrencies that are differently struc-
tured are more likely to be securities regulated by the SEC. This confounds 
regulated entities and provides little guidance on how firms should structure 
their offerings or tokens. Lawyers, too, are unsure of how to advise clients.24
SEC Chairman Jay Clayton noted that the “most disturbing” feature of ICOs 
is lawyers providing “equivocal advice.”25 This uncertainty must be ad-
dressed for the benefit of all stakeholders: cryptocurrency firms, regulatory 
entities, and even the lawyers involved.
This Note provides a standard for evaluating cryptocurrency ICOs that 
is consistent with the Howey test but still provides room for the cryptocur-
rency market to grow.26 Part I discusses the rise of cryptocurrencies, begin-
ning with bitcoin. It examines the deeply factual problem that regulation of 
bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies gives rise to: whether or not a cryptocur-
17. Verstein, supra note 13, at 456.
18. See id.
19. Id. at 455.
20. Commodities Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1a(9) (2012).
21. Verstein, supra note 13, at 455–56.
22. Investor Bulletin: Initial Coin Offerings, supra note 7.
23. See In re Coinflip, Inc., CFTC No. 15-29, at 3, [2015–2016 Transfer Binder] Comm. 
Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 33.583 (Sept. 17, 2015) (holding that bitcoin and other virtual currencies 
are commodities).




26. See infra Section III.B.
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rency is a security. Part II describes how cryptocurrencies present difficulties 
for the Howey test and raise the specter of regulatory arbitrage. Part III en-
dorses a standard that a cryptocurrency is only a commodity if it is built on 
blockchain technology that provides sufficient utility.
I. The History of Bitcoin and Its Regulation
A. The Basics of Blockchain Technology
Cryptocurrencies are made possible by a technological innovation: the 
blockchain.27 Put simply, the blockchain, a decentralized ledger, is a con-
nected list of encrypted transactions—like a database.28 The blockchain is an 
improvement on conventional databases because it solves the problem of 
trusting intermediaries.29 In typical transactions, “you have to believe the in-
termediary will store the data accurately.”30 In a cryptocurrency blockchain, 
transactions are funneled through coin “miners,” who solve complicated 
cryptographic problems to securely verify them.31 The ability for independ-
ent individuals to verify digital transactions through cryptography, without 
involving centralized institutions like a bank or government, is an innova-
tion with huge potential.32 The technology, though still new, enticed inves-
tors and drove up the valuation of cryptocurrencies like bitcoin, turning it 
into one of the most volatile assets traded today.33 The law historically strug-
27. Jerry Brito & Andrea Castillo, Bitcoin: A Primer for Policymakers 5–10 (2d 
ed. 2016).
28. Dov Greenbaum, Opinion, What Bitcoin Needs Is a Few Good Regulations, Wall 
Street J. (Dec. 14, 2017, 6:27 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/what-bitcoin-needs-is-a-few-
good-regulations-1513294030 (on file with the Michigan Law Review) (“A blockchain is effec-
tively an interconnected, distributed ledger.”).
29. Irving Wladawsky-Berger, The Evolution of Trust in the Era of Platforms and Block-
chain, Wall Street J.: CIO J. (Sept. 8, 2017, 1:51 PM), https://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2017/09/08/
the-evolution-of-trust-in-the-era-of-platforms-and-blockchains/ (on file with the Michigan 
Law Review) (“Trust is one of the key attributes associated with blockchain technologies. A 
2015 Economist issue called blockchain ‘The Trust Machine,’ and noted in one of its articles 
that blockchain ‘offers a way for people who do not know or trust each other to create a record 
of who owns what that will compel the assent of everyone concerned. It is a way of making and 









33. For reference, bitcoin traded at $5,518.85 on October 24, 2017. Bitcoin (USD) Price,
Coindesk, https://www.coindesk.com/price/ (on file with the Michigan Law Review). Within 
three months bitcoin leapt up to $19,783 then plunged back to $10,370. Mike Bird & Gregor 
Stuart Hunter, Just Another Day for Bitcoin—A 25% Plunge, Wall Street J. (Jan. 16, 2018, 
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gles with technological innovations because it relies on precedent and, there-
fore, does not reliably envision future developments. Grappling with techno-
logical changes is a continuing challenge for the legal community, and cryp-
tocurrencies put that challenge into stark relief.34
B. The Rise of Bitcoin
Bitcoin is the most popular of available cryptocurrencies.35 Bitcoin min-
ers verify transactions on the blockchain by solving complicated cryptog-
raphy problems and are rewarded with bitcoins.36 Bitcoins can be used by
whoever accepts bitcoin for payment, and their price depends on the mar-
ket.37 But, it remains unresolved “[w]hether bitcoin will ultimately be a store 
of value, akin to digital gold, or a means of payment.”38 Equally puzzling for 
lawyers, regulated entities, and regulatory agencies is the question of how the 
law should apply to bitcoin.
Viewing bitcoin as a commodity, as the CFTC suggests,39 makes sense 
because its primary function is storing value.40 This characterization places it 
9:21 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/just-another-day-for-bitcoina-20-plunge-1516103459
(on file with the Michigan Law Review).
34. See Jeffrey Neuburger, Reflections on Technology-Related Legal Issues: Looking Back 
at 2017; Will 2018 Be a Quantum Leap Forward?, Proskauer: New Media & Tech. L. Blog
(Dec. 20, 2017), https://newmedialaw.proskauer.com/2017/12/20/reflections-on-technology-
related-legal-issues-looking-back-at-2017-will-2018-be-a-quantum-leap-forward/ [https://
perma.cc/4JKX-4NP2].
35. See Paul Vigna et al., Why Bitcoin? Why Now?, Wall Street J. (Dec. 9, 2017, 7:00 
AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-bitcoin-why-now-1512820800 (on file with the Michi-
gan Law Review) (“Growing interest in bitcoin attracted wider attention from the investment 
community . . . . More than 100 funds dedicated to bitcoin and its ilk have popped up.”).
36. Brito & Castillo, supra note 27, at 8–9. The mining feature is one of the funda-
mental features of bitcoin. Miners get bitcoin in return for verifying transactions. There are 
outstanding questions about what will happen to bitcoin and how it may be self-regulating 
when mining loses that incentive, but those are far off in the future. See generally Vigna et al.,
supra note 35 (“Bitcoin is created, or ‘mined,’ at a preset, steady pace. There are currently 
about 16.7 million bitcoin outstanding; mining will stop when the total reaches 21 million, ex-
pected to occur around the year 2140.”).
37. See Brito & Castillo, supra note 27, at 6–7, 13–14. SEC Chairman Jay Clayton 
noted that “market participants should treat payments and other transactions made in crypto-
currency as if cash were being handed from one party to another.” Clayton, supra note 1. In his 
view, cryptocurrencies are the equivalent of cash—they are akin to fiat currency. Id. But he 
states that calling something a “currency” does not mean it avoids the securities laws. Id.
38. Vigna et al., supra note 35.
39. In re Coinflip, Inc., CFTC No. 15-29, [2015–2016 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. 
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 33,583 (Sept. 17, 2015).
40. “Cryptocurrencies aren’t commodities because they don’t have an alternate use. 
People own them as a store for value.” Akshay Singh, Letter to the Editor, Bitcoin Can Be a 
Competitive Store of Value, Wall Street J. (Sept. 12, 2017, 11:47 AM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/bitcoin-can-be-a-competitive-store-of-value-1505231277 (on file with the Michigan 
Law Review). Singh suggests that stores of value aren’t commodities, but that contradicts our 
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in the same category as conventional commodities—most notably, gold.41
Although there are clear distinctions between bitcoin and gold, such as 
gold’s utility in creating other goods like jewelry and electronics,42 any legal 
distinction disappears once they are both declared commodities.43
But if bitcoin is a commodity, what are other cryptocurrencies? Droves 
of cryptocurrencies have been created in the years since bitcoin’s invention, 
but not all of them share bitcoin’s “commodity” characteristics, such as non-
fungibility, nonmarketability, and actual utility.44 In the absence of these fea-
tures, other cryptocurrencies would be considered securities, subject to the 
demanding (and expensive) disclosure requirements of the securities laws.
C. Initial Coin Offerings and Regulatory Concerns
Staying on the commodity side of the line has become increasingly com-
plicated with the advent of initial coin offerings, or ICOs.45 Instead of going 
to the conventional sources of funding—venture capital, angel investors, or 
banks—entrepreneurs with clever cryptocurrency ideas pre-sell their crypto-
currency and use the proceeds to fund their projects.46 This looks quite simi-
lar to a sale of securities.47
understanding of gold as a commodity. Regardless, the primary use of bitcoin seems to be as a 
volatile store of value. Like other currencies, and indeed like gold itself, “[m]arket forces de-
termine the price of currency which can be measured relative to other currencies.” Id.
41. See generally Pradeep Dubey et al., Is Gold an Efficient Store of Value?, 21 Econ. 
Theory 767, 767–68 (2003) (introducing the idea of commodities, such as gold and tobacco, as 
mediums of exchange and stores of value).
42. See id. at 768 (“[G]old yields utility.”).
43. The CFTC recently allowed bitcoin futures to be traded on commodities exchanges, 
just like gold. Alexander Osipovich, Bitcoin Futures Set to Start Trading as Regulator Gives 
Thumbs Up, Wall Street J. (Dec. 1, 2017, 3:43 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/regulator-
opens-way-to-bitcoin-futures-1512133201 (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
44. See, e.g., Matt Levine, Opinion SEC Halts a Silly Initial Coin Offering, Bloomberg
(Dec. 5, 2017, 5:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-12-05/sec-halts-a-
silly-initial-coin-offering [https://perma.cc/AGZ5-32CF] (PlexCoin is an example of a fraudu-
lent token that expresses these characteristics—it’s not fungible nor marketable nor provides 
any utility.).
45. See Steven Russolillo, Initial Coin Offerings Surge Past $4 Billion—And Regulators 
Are Worried, Wall Street J. (Dec. 14, 2017, 4:54 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/initial-
coin-offerings-surge-past-4-billionand-regulators-are-worried-1513235196 (on file with the 
Michigan Law Review).
46. Id. (“[An ICO] is a method of corporate fundraising that circumvents traditional 
capital markets. Typically tech startups, many involved in the digital-currency sector, raise 
money from investors in exchange for newly created digital coins or tokens, which they can 
trade.”).
47. Id. (“[S]ome regulators say ICOs should be regulated like securities.”).
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Concerned with potentially unregulated securities sales, the SEC has re-
cently begun enforcement actions on cryptocurrency ICOs.48 Its principal 
argument is that the cryptocurrency at issue is an investment contract, and 
therefore a security subject to the SEC’s regulatory jurisdiction.49 Initially, 
the SEC only pursued fraudulent cryptocurrency offerings, but more recent-
ly, it has also targeted seemingly legitimate tokens.50 As a cryptocurrency 
shares more of the bitcoin “commodity” features, when does the SEC lose 
the authority to regulate? Quite unhelpfully, SEC Chairman Jay Clayton 
commented that “[a]s securities law practitioners know well, the answer de-
pends on the facts.”51
Nevertheless, the SEC is considering imposing gatekeeper liability on 
lawyers who assist with ICOs.52 In a recent speech, Chairman Clayton casti-
gated ICO lawyers for “tak[ing] a step back from the key issues—including 
whether the ‘coin’ is a security and whether the offering qualifies for an ex-
emption from registration—even in circumstances where registration would 
likely be warranted.”53 He instructed SEC staff “to be on high alert” for ICOs 
that may be “contrary to . . . the professional obligations of the U.S. securities 
bar.”54
But the SEC’s position is still ambiguous. Early releases warn investors 
against cryptocurrencies but do not make a definite finding on whether they 
are securities.55 Although the SEC’s position on cryptocurrencies remains 
unclear, enforcement actions have strictly applied the Howey test.56 Chair-
man Clayton recently attempted to clarify the issue, noting that “[b]efore 
launching a cryptocurrency or a product with its value tied to one or more 
cryptocurrencies, its promoters must either (1) be able to demonstrate that 
the currency or product is not a security or (2) comply with applicable regis-
tration and other requirements under our securities laws.”57 This rule is still 
48. See, e.g., Paul Vigna, SEC Targets Initial Coin Offering ‘Scam,’ Wall Street J. (Dec. 
4, 2017, 11:51 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/secs-cyber-unit-charges-canadian-firm-
with-coin-offering-fraud-1512400168 (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
49. DAO Report, supra note 3 (applying the Howey test to argue that DAO Tokens are 
securities).
50. Compare Levine, supra note 44, with Matt Levine, SEC Halts a Real Initial Coin Of-
fering, Bloomberg (Dec. 12, 2017, 3:20 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-
12-12/sec-halts-a-real-initial-coin-offering [https://perma.cc/MXX9-WWDN].
51. Clayton, supra note 1.
52. John Reed Stark, Beware ICO Lawyers, You’re the Next Target, Law360 (Jan. 31, 
2018, 12:55 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1006847/beware-ico-lawyers-you-re-the-
next-target (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Investor Bulletin: Initial Coin Offerings, supra note 7.
56. The SEC goes through each prong of the Howey test in their argument. See, e.g.,
DAO Report, supra note 3.
57. Clayton, supra note 1.
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problematic because “demonstrat[ing] that the currency or product is not a 
security” is precisely the issue on which regulated entities need guidance.58
The different classifications between bitcoin—as a commodity—and 
most other cryptocurrencies—as securities—blurs a previously clear separa-
tion.59 Whether a cryptocurrency is a commodity depends on a factual 
judgment made by the SEC, CFTC, or a federal judge.60 This creates expen-
sive uncertainty for both cryptocurrency firms and regulatory authorities. 
Each individual cryptocurrency must be analyzed to determine whether it 
crosses the line between commodity and security. This may stifle innovation 
in the blockchain space because creators cannot be certain of their regulatory 
obligations or cost. For the regulator, it signals suboptimal enforcement in 
the area because none of the agencies are certain where the line lies.
II. Cryptocurrencies Present Challenges for Howey
Part II discusses the test for an investment contract, the Howey test, and 
how cryptocurrencies and their underlying technology have trouble meeting 
the test’s requirements. These difficulties create regulatory uncertainty re-
garding whether a new cryptocurrency does or does not satisfy the test. 
A. The SEC and the Howey Test
For the SEC to bring cryptocurrencies within its jurisdiction, it must 
show that a particular cryptocurrency is a security as defined by the Securi-
ties Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act). 
The Securities Act defines a security as “any note, stock . . . [or] investment 
contract.”61 Although the Exchange Act has a slightly different definition,62
courts use similar interpretations.63 Because cryptocurrencies are not enu-
merated in either Act (they certainly were not contemplated in the 1930s), 
58. Id.
59. The CFTC claims that “There is no inconsistency between the SEC’s analysis and the 
CFTC’s determination . . . that virtual tokens may be commodities . . . depending on the par-
ticular facts and circumstances.” Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, A CFTC Primer 
on Virtual Currencies 14 (2017), http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/documents/file/
labcftc_primercurrencies100417.pdf [https://perma.cc/DN62-RGLF]. Although that may be 
true, it is far less clear for regulated entities on where their regulatory obligations lie. See gener-
ally Bromberg, supra note 12.
60. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, at 14 supra note 59 (explaining that classi-
fication as a security or commodity varies “depending on the particular facts and circumstanc-
es”).
61. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, § 2(1), 48 Stat. 74, 74 (codified as amended 
at 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2012)).
62. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291 § 3(a)(10), 48 Stat. 881, 883–84
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10)).
63. See, e.g., Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 686 n.1 (1985).
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the SEC must fit them into the catchall term: “investment contract.”64 Con-
gress included the term to cover any novel financial instruments that people 
may conjure up in the future, but has left it up to courts to define the term 
on a case-by-case basis.65
The Supreme Court adopted the test for an investment contract in the 
seminal case SEC v. Howey.66 The case holds that an instrument is an in-
vestment contract, and therefore a security, if it satisfies every element of a 
four-prong test: (1) an investment of money (2) in a common enterprise 
(3) with the expectation of profits (4) solely from the efforts of others.67
Cryptocurrencies present new challenges for this test because they may not 
be investments of money, and novel blockchain technology underlying the 
tokens may eliminate any efforts of others. Indeed, cryptocurrencies may 
even allow entrepreneurs to evade securities laws through careful token con-
struction.
Prong one, the investment of money element of the test,68 immediately 
presents a challenge for classifying cryptocurrencies as securities. This prong 
can be distilled into two parts: (1) whether there is an investment and 
(2) whether that investment is money.69 Cryptocurrencies with ICOs clearly 
satisfy the second part because investors pay for the tokens.70 But here, mon-
ey does not strictly mean cash.71 Consumers can participate in the ICO using 
other cryptocurrencies such as bitcoin, or even capital assets.72
The more confounding question is whether there is an investment. In 
United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, the Supreme Court found that a 
scheme to sell apartment units was not a security because it was not an in-
vestment.73 Instead, the purchase of housing was found to be primarily for 
consumption.74 Likewise, digital tokens that are created primarily for con-
sumption, a service granted by the originating firm, should not be treated as 
64. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946) (“It embodies a flexible rather than 
a static principle, one that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless and variable schemes 
devised by those who seek the use of the money of others on the promise of profits.”).
65. Id. at 298–99.
66. Id. at 301.
67. Id.; see also SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 393 (2004).
68. Howey, 328 U.S. at 301.
69. Id.
70. DAO Report, supra note 3, at 5 (“In exchange for ETH, The DAO created DAO 
Tokens . . . .”).
71. See, e.g., Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 560 n.12 (1979) (“This is not 
to say that a person’s ‘investment,’ in order to meet the definition of an investment contract, 
must take the form of cash only, rather than of goods and services.”); Hector v. Wiens, 533 
F.2d 429, 432–33 (9th Cir. 1976).
72. See, e.g., DAO Report, supra note 3.
73. 421 U.S. 837, 859–60 (1975) (“[A]cquiring housing rather than making an invest-
ment for profit[] is not within the scope of the federal securities laws.”).
74. United Hous., 421 U.S. at 858.
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an investment. That is, if consumers can exchange their tokens for a service 
or product, it would cease to be an investment under Forman.75
Cryptocurrency creators seeking to escape SEC oversight can leverage 
this distinction between consumption and investment to engage in regulato-
ry arbitrage. They can ensure that their token provides nominal utility—not 
just a means of raising money or a method of tracking the value of the com-
pany itself.76 Moreover, cryptocurrencies can be designed to have utility be-
cause creators typically make them as a currency for their particular enter-
prise.77 Because failing to satisfy even one prong of the Howey test allows an 
asset to escape securities regulation,78 the utility function of a token is a criti-
cal measure of how it will fare under regulatory scrutiny.
Prong two, the common enterprise prong,79 will likely be met by most if 
not all cryptocurrencies selling tokens. Circuits are split in their interpreta-
tion of this prong, with some favoring horizontal commonality and some fa-
voring either broad or narrow vertical commonality.80 In horizontal com-
monality, investors pool funds into an investment, and the profits of each 
investor correlate with those of other investors.81 Cryptocurrencies sold in 
ICOs have this trait as the return from the purchase of a digital token will be 
distributed pro rata to each investor.82 The appreciation of token value is 
much like that of stock, in that the corresponding gain for each investor de-
pends on how much of the token they own.
Vertical commonality introduces a promoter83 to the scheme.84 Narrow 
vertical commonality considers whether the profits of an investor are tied to 
75. See id.
76. Though, SEC Chairman Clayton noted that this isn’t a formalistic view: “Merely 
calling a token a ‘utility’ token or structuring it to provide some utility does not prevent the 
token from being a security.” Clayton, supra note 1.
77. See David Goodboy, 3 Types of Cryptocurrencies You Need to Know, NASDAQ (Jan. 
15, 2018, 3:00 PM), https://www.nasdaq.com/article/3-types-of-cryptocurrencies-you-need-to-
know-cm905488 (on file with the Michigan Law Review) (discussing that “utility cryptocurren-
cy is designed for a particular task” as opposed to transactional or platform cryptocurrencies).
78. See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946).
79. Id. at 301.
80. See, e.g., SEC v. Eurobond Exch. Ltd., 13 F.3d 1334, 1339 (9th Cir. 1994); Curran v. 
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d 216, 222 (6th Cir. 1980), aff’d 456 U.S. 
353 (1982); SEC v. Cont’l Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516, 521–22 (5th Cir. 1974).
81. See, e.g., Curran, 622 F.2d at 221.
82. See Crypto Dan, Equi Capital ICO—Transforming Venture Capital, Medium (Feb. 
28, 2018), https://medium.com/@info_19130/equi-capital-ico-transforming-venture-capital-
3c49b4aee082 [https://perma.cc/A7DU-YX7S]. Investors in ICOs track the value of the in-
vestment based on how much the market values the cryptocurrency. See id. If a coin increases 
in value, the investors return depends on how much they own—a pro rata share. See id.
83. A promoter provides expertise to the enterprise to increase its value. The Howey test 
refers to promoters as someone who generates an expectation of profit. Howey, 328 U.S. at 298 
(“[In this type of enterprise, investors] profit solely through the efforts of the promoter or of 
some one other than themselves.”).
84. See, e.g., Cont’l Commodities, 497 F.2d at 516.
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a promoter,85 while broad vertical commonality considers whether the suc-
cess of the investor depends on the promoter’s expertise.86 This analysis is 
trickier than that of horizontal commonality and overlaps substantially with 
the fourth prong of the Howey test, from the efforts of others. The difficulties 
introduced by vertical commonality are best addressed in prong four.87
Prong three, the expectation of profits,88 refers to the return an investor 
seeks on their investment, rather than the profits that the system or issuer of 
a cryptocurrency might earn.89 This ultimately depends on the degree to 
which the token provides utility. Tokens released through ICOs will likely 
meet this prong of the test because investors are not paying for the utility of 
the tokens for enterprises that have not yet launched. They are merely in-
vesting in the token for its volatility and potential to appreciate in value. 
Likewise, tokens purchased for their utility that happen to appreciate in val-
ue due to market forces would also satisfy this prong.90
Prong four, solely from the efforts of others,91 is the most problematic 
for cryptocurrencies seeking to be regulated as commodities. Courts have 
interpreted the “efforts from others” test to mean managerial or entrepre-
neurial efforts,92 making the key question whether the cryptocurrency origi-
nators are contributing these efforts. Cryptocurrency creators can persua-
sively argue that they do not contribute any effort beyond initially creating 
the token because there is no ongoing managerial or entrepreneurial task.93
At minimum, the decentralized nature of the new technology means that 
85. See, e.g., Eurobond Exch., 13 F.3d at 1339.
86. See Cont’l Commodities, 497 F.2d at 522.
87. Resolving the circuit split may be a potential step toward clarifying the regulation of 
cryptocurrencies, but it is moot here. In circuits that use horizontal commonality, the fourth 
prong will be the lynchpin of the discussion. In circuits that use vertical commonality, the 
main cryptocurrency argument against Howey will apply to both the second and fourth prongs. 
Therefore, this Note focuses on the fourth prong.
88. Howey, 328 U.S. at 301.
89. See, e.g., SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 394 (2004).
90. The outcome of this prong, in particular, depends on how the facts are character-
ized. If there isn’t an investment of money, then there is unlikely to be an expectation of profit. 
In that case, this prong is moot because the asset would have already failed to meet the re-
quirements of prong one.
91. Howey, 328 U.S. at 301.
92. See, e.g., SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 479–84 (5th Cir. 1974); 
SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., 474 F.2d 476, 482–83 (9th Cir. 1973).
93. See Frequently Asked Questions, Bitcoin, https://bitcoin.org/en/faq [https://
perma.cc/ET88-9LUW] (“Nobody owns the Bitcoin network much like no one owns the tech-
nology behind email. Bitcoin is controlled by all Bitcoin users around the world. While devel-
opers are improving the software, they can’t force a change in the Bitcoin protocol because all 
users are free to choose what software and version they use.” (emphasis added)).
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cryptocurrencies do not fit this prong as readily as conventional investment 
contracts do.94
Fortunately for the SEC, truly fraudulent ICOs will likely satisfy this 
prong because firms engaging in the scheme will want to cash in on the of-
fering.95 The money raised by an ICO is often managed by a person or entity 
that would satisfy this final prong.96 In contrast, tokens like bitcoin, which 
do not have a managerial or entrepreneurial effort behind them,97 would not 
satisfy this test. The origination of bitcoin had no such initial offering—
instead, the network was created and the first “block” of bitcoins was mined 
and put into circulation.98
Even if bitcoin had originated with a sale of tokens, the SEC would still 
have had to show how all four prongs of the Howey test were satisfied. As a 
useful comparison, a company that sells gold is not selling a security every 
time it transacts in gold.99 The value of that gold, even as an investment, is 
not tied to anything that the gold company does.100 Likewise, the value of 
bitcoin is not affected by managerial or entrepreneurial efforts—it depends 
on how valuable the market thinks the technology is.101
B. The Vanishing Line Between Commodity and Security
Viewing cryptocurrencies as commodities helps explains a hole in 
Howey. Tokens that provide utility are more like commodities, such as gold 
or wheat, than securities.102 When analyzing commodities like gold or silver,
courts hold that those minerals are not securities because their value de-
94. See Nathaniel Popper, Understanding Ethereum, Bitcoin’s Virtual Cousin, N.Y. 
Times (Oct. 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/01/technology/what-is-
ethereum.html (on file with the Michigan Law Review) (“As with Bitcoin, Ethereum mining 
serves a dual process of getting new Ether into the world while providing an incentive for peo-
ple to join the network and help maintain the Ethereum blockchain.” (emphasis added)).
95. See, e.g., Vigna, supra note 48 (“The SEC alleged that PlexCorps violated securities 
laws by marketing and selling up to $15 million worth of cryptocurrencies . . . .” The SEC then 
froze the assets of PlexCorps.).
96. Id.
97. See Marco Iansiti & Karim R. Lakhani, The Truth About Blockchain, Harv. Bus. 
Rev., Jan.–Feb. 2017, at 118.
98. Benjamin Wallace, The Rise and Fall of Bitcoin, Wired (Nov. 23, 2011, 2:52 PM), 
https://www.wired.com/2011/11/mf_bitcoin/ (on file with the Michigan Law Review) (“Naka-
moto himself mined the first 50 bitcoins—which came to be called the genesis block—on Janu-
ary 3, 2009.”).
99. See Noa v. Key Futures, Inc., 638 F.2d 77, 79 (9th Cir. 1980) (“Applying these stand-
ards to the facts here, we hold that no investment contract was created. Once the purchase of 
silver bars was made, the profits to the investor depended upon the fluctuations of the silver 
market, not the managerial efforts of Key Futures. The decision to buy or sell was made by the 
owner of the silver.”); see also SEC v. R.G. Reynolds Enters., 952 F.2d 1125 (9th Cir. 1991); SEC 
v. Belmont Reid & Co., 794 F.2d 1388, 1391 (9th Cir. 1986).
100. See Noa, 638 F.2d at 79.
101. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 93.
102. See supra Section II.A.
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pends on market forces, not the efforts of others.103 Similarly, the value of a 
token like bitcoin hinges only on the market’s perception of how valuable the 
token and its underlying technology will be in the future.
The CFTC reinforced this argument in In re Coinflip, in which the 
Commission asserted that virtual currencies, including bitcoin, are com-
modities under the Commodities Exchange Act.104 The CFTC reasoned that 
“Section 1a(9) of the Act defines ‘commodity’ to include, among other 
things, ‘all services, rights, and interests in which contracts for future deliv-
ery are presently or in the future dealt in.’ ”105 If virtual currencies are com-
modities, subject to CFTC regulation by the CFTC, then they cannot also be 
securities regulated by the SEC.
The line between securities and commodities, or security-tokens and 
nonsecurity-tokens, is now an intensely fact-specific inquiry.106 The SEC 
must explore the details of the token, from whether the entity originating the 
token is providing significant managerial efforts to whether the tokens have 
utility beyond that of an investment vehicle.107 The framework this regulato-
ry scheme creates is needlessly complicated. Some cryptocurrencies are 
commodities, while some are securities, and determining where that line is 
drawn is burdensome.108 Regulatory stakeholders will have to pay the cost of 
that uncertainty. Fraudulent coin schemes will intermingle with legitimate 
coins, causing the SEC to both over- and underenforce the securities laws: 
legitimate tokens may be attacked while fraudulent tokens may be missed.
More troubling, however, is that tokens initially appearing to be securi-
ties may eventually not satisfy all prongs of the Howey test as their creators 
allow the blockchain technology to take over. Historically, instruments de-
clared to be securities always remained securities thereafter.109 Securities 
laws, and Howey, certainly did not contemplate an instrument that changes 
over time.110 In light of this, the line-drawing problem between commodity 
and security takes a new edge—the line is not only troublesome to draw but 
also dynamic. 
103. E.g., R.G. Reynolds, 952 F.2d at 1135; Belmont Reid, 794 F.2d at 1391; Noa, 638 F.2d 
at 79.
104. In re Coinflip, Inc., CFTC No. 15-29, at 3, [2015–2016 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. 
L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 33,583 (Sept. 17, 2015).
105. Id. (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 1(a)(9) (2012)).
106. See supra Section II.A. The SEC will have to do a Howey analysis on each token it 
chooses to pursue. See also sources cited supra note 3.
107. See DAO Report, supra note 3.
108. See supra Section II.A.
109. For example, the enumerated categories in §2(a)(1) of the Securities Act of 1933 
suggest this: stocks remain stocks; notes remain notes. Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a)(1), 15 
U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2012).
110. Alternatively, they could be viewed as separate instruments across subsequent sales. 
That is, token A sold during an ICO is distinct from token A sold well after it has utility.
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Solutions to this problem lie in developing clear metrics as to whether a 
cryptocurrency should be treated as a security, enabling the SEC to more ef-
ficiently tackle the question. A more nuanced cryptocurrency analysis will 
separate the scams from viable tokens: cryptocurrencies released for the in-
trinsic benefits of their technology, rather than as a method to evade the se-
curities laws, will fall outside the definition of a security. This is the best-case 
scenario for the digital token industry and the SEC because fraudulent 
schemes ultimately discourage investment. Enabling the SEC to sniff out 
fraud while preserving the well-functioning cryptocurrency firms will propel 
this new industry onward.
As the market for cryptocurrencies and their ICOs explodes, we can ex-
pect to see more creative formulations to evade securities regulation. Because 
bitcoin is already considered a commodity,111 similar financial instruments 
will contend that they too do not meet the four prongs of the Howey test.112
Solutions to this problem must address the realities above: that tokens that 
satisfy the Howey test are securities, tokens that are not securities are com-
modities, and a clear, static regulatory categorization of securities and com-
modities is preserved.
III. Crafting a Standard: How Cryptocurrency Creators Can 
Rebuff Howey
Classifying a security at its outset is important to serve the goals of the 
securities laws.113 The SEC notes that the “two basic objectives” of the Securi-
ties Act of 1933 are to “require that investors receive financial and other sig-
nificant information concerning securities being offered for public sale; and 
prohibit deceit, misrepresentations, and other fraud in the sale of securi-
ties.”114 Justice Powell noted that “the parties’ inability to determine at the 
time of the transaction whether the Acts apply neither serves the Acts’ pro-
tective purpose nor permits the purchaser to compensate for the added risk 
of no protection when negotiating the transaction.”115 Similarly, crafting a 
coherent standard for cryptocurrencies within the confines of existing secu-
rities law is critical for both buyers and sellers of these tokens.116
This Part offers a solution to the problem of cryptocurrencies evading 
the Howey test and creates a dynamic line between securities and commodi-
111. In re Coinflip, Inc., CFTC No. 15-29, at 3, [2015–2016 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. 
L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 33,583 (Sept. 17, 2015) (holding that bitcoin and other virtual currencies are 
commodities).
112. See, e.g., DAO Report, supra note 3.
113. See What We Do, U.S. SEC, https://www.sec.gov/Article/whatwedo.html [https://
perma.cc/G68D-SH2M] (explaining that classification is one way the SEC “protect[s] inves-
tors, maintain[s] fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate[s] capital formation”).
114. Id. (cleaned up).
115. Gould v. Ruefenacht, 471 U.S. 701, 705–06 (1985).
116. See id.
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ties.117 It first introduces the necessary characteristics of a sound policy: 
bringing tokens that meet all four prongs of Howey into the SEC’s regulatory 
grasp, excluding those that do not, and reducing the regulatory burden that 
arises out of a deeply factual question. Then, it offers a recommendation that 
satisfies those requirements and is both legally plausible and administratively 
workable. The recommendation introduces a standard that allows the SEC to 
more efficiently analyze tokens and tighten or loosen the regulatory con-
straints on cryptocurrency ICOs depending on the agency’s own policy pref-
erences.
A. The Components of a Solution
A solution must bring fraudulent ICOs clearly within the regulatory 
reach of the SEC or the CFTC.118 If a token does not meet all four prongs of 
the Howey test, it must be a commodity, and if it satisfies all four prongs, it 
must be a security.119 Although Congress did not contemplate cryptocurren-
cies, the Howey test was intended to cover novel instruments that may arise 
in the future.120 A proposed solution to the Howey test must ensure that a 
token that does not meet its four prongs is beyond the purview of securities 
law, rather than simply defeating the test’s capacity.121 Under the framework 
illustrated in Part II, cryptocurrencies that do not meet the four prongs of 
the Howey test fall within the definition of commodities. If the SEC does not 
have the power to regulate, the CFTC does.122 Indeed, the CFTC has filed en-
forcement actions for “fraudulent activity involving virtual currencies,” indi-
cating that circumventing the SEC will not leave fraud unchecked.123
Finally, the solution must, at least in part, relieve the regulatory burden 
cryptocurrencies introduce. In the absence of any modifications, the SEC 
must apply the Howey test.124 As illustrated above, this is a deeply factual in-
quiry.125 And because the stage of development of a cryptocurrency affects 
117. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
118. Examples of such coins include Bananacoin. Bananacoin, https://
www.bananacoin.io/ (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
119. See Howey, 328 U.S. at 301.
120. See id. at 299 (“It embodies a flexible rather than a static principle, one that is capa-
ble of adaptation to meet the countless and variable schemes devised by those who seek the use 
of the money of others on the promise of profits.”).
121. The implication here is that if a token does meet the four prongs of Howey, then it is 
safely categorized as a commodity—an asset that does not need the searching disclosures of the 
securities laws.
122. See supra Section II.B.
123. Christopher Conniff et al., CFTC Reasserts Its Role in Virtual Currency Regulation,
Law360 (Jan. 25, 2018, 3:40 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1005846/cftc-reasserts-its-
role-in-virtual-currency-regulation (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
124. See Howey, 328 U.S. at 301.
125. See supra Section II.A.
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the Howey analysis, the factual burden is even greater.126 Alleviating that 
burden is a central concern, along with providing certainty in application.
The most straightforward way for this drifting line between security and 
commodity to be resolved is through agency action, either by the SEC or the 
CFTC or both.127 More specifically, a solution must reconcile the Howey test 
with cryptocurrencies like bitcoin, which is widely regarded as a commodity. 
The SEC or the CFTC should release guidance that creates an articulable 
standard within the Howey framework. An interpretation of the Howey test 
for an investment contract that cryptocurrency creators and the agencies 
themselves can use to filter through the thousands of coin offerings makes 
these fact-specific questions significantly less burdensome.
B. Is Blockchain Technology Essential to the Enterprise?
Regulators perceive cryptocurrency ICOs as means for avoiding en-
forcement actions while raising substantial amounts of capital.128 This is a 
justifiable impression given that only one in ten tokens is actually in use fol-
lowing ICOs.129 If a token cannot be used, it will not pass the Howey test. Be-
cause a token is not functional, it must be an investment and it must be built 
with managerial efforts.130 Those 90% of tokens not in use will be defined as 
securities under the Howey test.131 But the remaining 10% should be treated 
as commodities.132
To tackle the 10% treated as commodities, regulators should impose a 
standard that analyzes how essential the blockchain is to the enterprise. This 
standard should be based on the most problematic prong of the Howey test: 
“from the efforts of others.”133 Courts have read this prong to mean manage-
rial and entrepreneurial efforts, but implicitly it has always been efforts that 
advance a manager’s interests.134 In SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, the 
Ninth Circuit concluded that the “managerial efforts” were efforts that “pro-
duce[d] the money which [made] him rich.”135 The Fifth Circuit reiterated 
126. See supra Section II.A.
127. Legislation and judicial actions being the other two methods, agency actions are by 
far the most expedient.
128. See Russolillo, supra note 45.
129. See Olga Kharif, Only One in 10 Tokens Is in Use Following Initial Coin Offerings,
Bloomberg (Oct. 23, 2017, 5:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-10-23/
only-one-in-10-tokens-is-in-use-following-initial-coin-offerings [https://perma.cc/78TA-
TPQ7].
130. See supra Section II.A.
131. See Kharif, supra note 129.
132. See id.
133. See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946).
134. See, e.g., SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 485 (5th Cir. 1974); SEC v. 
Glenn W. Turner Enters., 474 F.2d 476, 482–83 (9th Cir. 1973).
135. 474 F.2d at 482.
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this theme in SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary.136 In both cases, managers en-
riched themselves through their efforts. But that is not the case for crypto-
currencies. If the cryptocurrency is functioning properly, the managers will 
work to remove themselves from the picture because the whole point of the 
blockchain is self-governance.137 Bitcoin is illustrative here—there is no enti-
ty or organization that controls bitcoin;138 the technology governs itself.139
When analyzing the final prong, the SEC should evaluate managerial ef-
forts and find that an increasing level of sophistication with blockchain cuts 
against a finding of managerial efforts. The more that an enterprise depends 
on blockchain technology, the more likely a manager will ultimately elimi-
nate his or her own duties in the future. Likewise, a token that does not use a 
blockchain in a manner like bitcoin will not get deferential treatment be-
cause it requires the promoter’s continuing intervention. This is a sliding 
scale: the closer a token is to achieving a fully self-governing platform, the 
more likely it will not have “the efforts of the others” to the degree contem-
plated by Howey.140
The test is a predictive tool to separate tokens that are more likely to 
eliminate management versus those that are less likely to do so. If a token 
does not need a blockchain to function, then there is no reason to presume 
that the managers will automate themselves out of a job. Management that 
seeks to perpetuate its job will always meet the final prong of the Howey test, 
and the eventual disappearance of that prong may never occur. These tokens 
are typically the ones that society is interested in regulating as securities be-
cause their creators use the craze over cryptocurrencies to raise funds out-
side the reach of securities laws.141 These schemes use tokens as a gimmick to 
avoid regulation at the expense of investor protection.
As a matter of policy, this makes sense; the proposed standard incentiv-
izes the right type of tokens that society wants to develop—tokens that use 
the blockchain for the purpose for which it was developed.142 Innovative uses 
of technology, like bitcoin, are such examples.143 Developing a self-governing 
system like bitcoin will increase the likelihood that all four prongs of Howey
are not satisfied, putting the scheme outside of the SEC’s regulatory reach 
136. 497 F.2d at 483.
137. See Iansiti & Lakhani, supra note 97.
138. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 93.
139. See id.
140. See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946).
141. See Investor Bulletin: Initial Coin Offerings, supra note 7.
142. This has been done before with emerging growth companies—a class of companies 
that receives less regulatory scrutiny because the SEC wants to encourage growth. See Emerging 
Growth Companies, U.S. SEC (last modified Nov. 30, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/
smallbusiness/goingpublic/EGC [https://perma.cc/AYL7-S5XS]. See generally The Great Chain 
of Being Sure About Things, supra note 30.
143. See Wladawsky-Berger, supra note 29.
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and into the hands of the CFTC. This gives an excellent incentive structure 
for currency creators: keep the crypto in cryptocurrency or face the SEC. 
This structure ensures that the core innovation of this technology serves to 
create efficiency, fairness, and growth, rather than merely serving as a plat-
form for under-the-radar fundraising. 
This is not to say that blockchain should only be used in self-governing 
tokens. Rather, if entrepreneurs use the blockchain without creating a self-
governing system, then they should register it as a security or otherwise 
comply with the securities laws.144 Creating a token that does not rely on the 
blockchain while seeking exemption from the securities laws reeks of regula-
tory arbitrage.145 If managerial oversight will always be needed, then it be-
comes increasingly unlikely that the token would not satisfy the fourth prong 
of Howey.
The more a cryptocurrency creator can show that a token legitimately 
uses the blockchain, making it similar to bitcoin,146 the greater the presump-
tion against the cryptocurrency satisfying the fourth prong of Howey. Con-
sequently, that sort of token is more likely to be a commodity. Those that 
want to abuse the investor craze over “cryptocurrency” as a buzzword will 
still meet all of the Howey prongs, and the instruments they are promoting 
will fall within the definition of a security. This standard alleviates the factual 
burden on the SEC by distilling the fourth prong into a simple principle: are 
you automating yourself away or not? In other words, the standard measures 
the ability of the cryptocurrency to eliminate management.
Perhaps what is most attractive for the SEC about this test is that it can 
be adjusted to be as inclusive or exclusive as the SEC would like. For exam-
ple, claiming that the blockchain foundation behind a coin must be so essen-
tial as to eventually eliminate the need for managers would restrict the to-
144. See, e.g., KODAK and WENN Digital Partner to Launch Major Blockchain Initiative 
and Cryptocurrency, Kodak (Jan. 9, 2018), https://www.kodak.com/corp/press_center/
ko-
dak_and_wenn_digital_partner_to_launch_major_blockchain_initiative_and_cryptocurrency/
default.htm (on file with the Michigan Law Review). (“This initial Coin Offering is issued un-
der SEC guidelines as a security token under Regulation 506 (c) as an exempt offering.”).
145. Regulatory Arbitrage, Investopedia, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/
regulatory-arbitrage.asp [https://perma.cc/N38D-8SYR] (“Regulatory arbitrage is a practice 
whereby firms capitalize on loopholes in regulatory systems in order to circumvent unfavora-
ble regulation.”).
146. Firms can explain how and why blockchain technology is essential to tackling the 
problem; i.e., why cloud storage has a classic intermediary problem (because everyone has to 
store their data on a third party’s server), and the blockchain naturally remedies that by decen-
tralizing storage space. More granularly, firms can follow the recommended steps in the Coin-
base white paper A Securities Law Framework for Blockchain Tokens, such as controlling the 
timing of sale to be after the project is live, to show that their coins are not securities. Coin-
base et al., A Securities Law Framework for Blockchain Tokens (2016), https://
www.coinbase.com/legal/securities-law-framework.pdf (on file with the Michigan Law Re-
view).
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kens to less than a handful that have reached that stage, like bitcoin.147 If eve-
ry other token is a security, and that may be the SEC’s wish, then this test can 
accomplish that. But at the same time, if a coin has the reach and the decen-
tralization of bitcoin, the SEC may see the value in reducing the regulatory 
burden and allowing the token to continue development with the profits ac-
crued from an ICO.148 This standard allows for that judgment at the time of 
an initial sale, a critical feature in administering the standard.149
Further, the SEC can ensure that a security will always be a security.150
Cryptocurrencies change over the course of their development. At concep-
tion, sales of the token are securities because they give no utility and need 
managerial efforts.151 But when a cryptocurrency reaches a critical level of 
self-governance, it would almost certainly not satisfy the Howey test if new 
tokens were sold. This is because the tokens either give substantial consump-
tion value or are fully self-governing.152 The alternative would be to test each 
sale against Howey, but that is a demanding factual analysis that would par-
ticularize the facts to such a degree that adjudications would be unpredicta-
ble. If one cryptocurrency was found to not be a security, other cryptocur-
rency creators would not have a clear understanding of whether or not they 
would be responsible for the securities laws. 
The biggest challenge to applying this standard is developing adminis-
trative expertise on the blockchain. Expecting the SEC to learn about block-
chains in order to decide cryptocurrency cases is a significant burden. But 
that burden is the product of technological innovation and will likely persist 
147. If one in ten tokens are in use following coin offerings, it is likely that only a small 
percentage are far enough in development to successfully argue that they can be fully automat-
ed in the future. See Kharif, supra note 129.
148. Cryptocurrencies and blockchain are socially valuable inventions, and allowing 
them to flourish by reducing the regulatory burden is a reasonable position for the SEC. See
Emerging Growth Companies, supra note 142; The Great Chain of Being Sure About Things,
supra note 30.
149. There may be concerns that this standard would introduce a line-drawing problem 
of when something has enough blockchain functionality or enough evidence that it will be self-
governing, but because it is being administered by the SEC, the agency can install any arbitrary 
line that they deem appropriate.
150. This problem arises if the SEC were to review cryptocurrencies at the point of each 
sale. There is some support for this. The securities laws are transaction based, not security 
based. Every sale of a security must be registered, Choi & Pritchard, supra note 10, at 96–97, 
so cryptocurrency originators could argue that subsequent sales of the same token are not se-
curities anymore because the factual circumstances have changed. Such a view would create an 
incredible factual burden on the SEC and provide many more questions than answers.
151. See Clayton, supra note 1. (“By and large, the structures of initial coin offerings that 
I have seen promoted involve the offer and sale of securities and directly implicate the securi-
ties registration requirements and other investor protection provisions of our federal securities 
laws.”).
152. See supra Section II.A.
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as blockchain technologies develop. In time, developing blockchain expertise 
at the SEC will become even more necessary.
Fortunately, there is an upside. If regulated entities know that the SEC 
will evaluate their tokens based on how well they articulate their blockchain-
based goals, they will have incentives to produce clear white papers and dis-
closures that can explain how their blockchain works and why they do not 
satisfy Howey. Typically, the SEC must show that an instrument is a securi-
ty.153 Instead, if the burden shifts to the token creator, the learning curve for 
the SEC is alleviated.
Society has an important interest in the development of novel technolo-
gies without burdening those technologies with unnecessary regulation. The 
standard articulated here offers a compromise. It would allow some crypto-
currencies that society deems useful or essential to develop while still pro-
tecting investors from fraudulent offerings.
C. Blockchain Examples: From Bitcoin to Bananacoin
Examples help illustrate how this test would work. First, consider both 
extremes. These are the easy cases. Fully decentralized cryptocurrencies like 
bitcoin are widely regarded as commodities, not securities.154 In these cases,
the blockchain has achieved its purposes and becomes a fully decentralized 
web.155 There are no managers and no entrepreneurs behind the service.156
Applying the standard to bitcoin, we would ask how essential to the enter-
prise is the blockchain.157 For bitcoin, the enterprise is based entirely on the 
blockchain. The goal of bitcoin, to be an alternative medium of exchange, 
necessitated a fully decentralized system that is the blockchain and nothing 
more.158
The other extreme is also simple. Consider a fraudulent token like Ba-
nanacoin, which is pegged to the export price of 1 kilogram of Laotian bana-
153. The SEC brings actions against firms if it believes they are unregistered securities 
involved in the transaction. See Choi & Pritchard, supra note 10, at 96–97; see, e.g, SEC v. 
Edwards, 540 U.S. 389 (2004); SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 294 (1946) (“The Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission instituted this action to restrain the respondents from using 
the mails and instrumentalities of interstate commerce in the offer and sale of unregistered and 
non-exempt securities in violation of § 5(a) of the Act.”); SEC v. SG Ltd., 265 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 
2001).
154. In re Coinflip, Inc., CFTC No. 15-29, at 3, [2015–2016 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. 
L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 33,583 (Sept. 17, 2015).
155. See generally Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash 
System, https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf [https://perma.cc/6SJZ-NUAY] (using bitcoin as an 
example of the need for a blockchain to be fully decentralized).
156. See id.
157. See supra Section III.B.
158. See Nakamoto, supra note 155, at 1 (“What is needed is an electronic payment sys-
tem based on cryptographic proof instead of trust . . . .”).
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nas.159 The blockchain is not essential here. The export price of bananas can 
be tracked, and has always been tracked, without a blockchain. There is no 
reason for this to be a decentralized web.160 Even if Bananacoin owners, or 
like-minded entrepreneurs, argue that the blockchain offers a fresh new tool, 
they would still fall within the definition of a security under Howey.161 Here, 
blockchain is merely a mechanism to raise money—not to create a decentral-
ized platform.162
The hard case is for those tokens that fall in between. Consider two to-
kens: Cloudtoken and Tezos.163 Cloudtoken uses tokens to help a decentral-
ized cloud storage platform.164 Tezos is “a decentralized blockchain” that 
governs itself “to facilitate formal verification” in smart contracts.165 At the 
initial coin offering stage, before the project is built, these will both undoubt-
edly be securities. But later in development, the analysis shifts. How essential
is the blockchain for this operation? For Cloudtoken, decentralizing cloud 
storage may be an interesting and innovative use of the blockchain, and 
there are strong arguments that this is more like bitcoin and less like Bana-
nacoin.166 Cloudtoken attempts to accomplish something that is already 
159. Bananacoin, Expansion of Banana Production in Laos with the Help of 
Crowdfunding 4, https://bananacoin.io/files/White_Paper_Bananacoin_en.pdf (on file with 
the Michigan Law Review) (“Bananacoin tokens will be exchangeable for a certain amount of 
Lady Finger bananas or equivalent monetary compensation. Because the token is backed by the 
market value of 1 kilogram of bananas . . . .”); see also Clint Rainey, Yes, You Can Now Buy Ba-
nanacoins, a Cryptocurrency Linked to Banana Prices, Grub Street (Jan. 22, 2018, 1:22 PM), 
http://www.grubstreet.com/2018/01/bananacoins-are-a-cryptocurrency-linked-to-banana-
prices.html [https://perma.cc/N7B6-Q6Z5].
160. This is abundantly clear from vague gestures toward blockchain in the white paper. 
“Blockchain” appears eleven times in a twenty-three page white paper and never sees more 
than a hand-wavy treatment. See Bananacoin, supra note 159.
161. The creators aim to “take advantage of blockchain technology in addressing real 
business objectives,” but absent is any justification for why they need a blockchain. See id. at 3. 
A relevant question an SEC investigation could ask under my theory is: does the Laotian bana-
na market have an intermediary problem that the blockchain is trying to remedy? Or, would 
the creators of the blockchain be able to step away once this system is self-governing?
162. Although the Bananacoin white paper purports that the token is to stave of the en-
dangered cultivar of the common banana, it does not explain why cryptocurrency is necessary. 
See Rainey, supra note 159 (“As many people know by now, the common banana (a cultivar 
known as the Cavendish) is endangered . . . . [but this] hasn’t stopped people from ridiculing 
the reach into cryptocurrency . . . .”); Bananacoin, supra note 159.
163. Cloud, Cloud ICO White Paper, https://buy-token.cloudwith.me/uploads/
themepdf/en/cloud_ico_whitepaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/46GK-NLQS]; L.M. Goodman, Te-
zos—A Self-Amending Crypto-Ledger (2014) https://tezos.com/static/papers/
white_paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/ST7H-XTGK].
164. Cloud, supra note 163.
165. Tezos, Tezos: The Self-Amending Cryptographic Ledger, https://
coindexter.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/whitepaper/whitepaper/27/Tezos_Overview.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KCZ5-UYAC].
166. “If people mostly use your token to buy cloud storage, then it is prepaid cloud stor-
age; if they mostly use it to speculate, then it is a security.” Matt Levine, What Is an ICO Any-
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widely available—cloud storage—but uses a novel technology to improve it. 
The utility it provides is clear: cloud storage. Whether or not the decentral-
ized blockchain technology is critical to its development such that it will 
eliminate management is less clear. Tezos, on the contrary, is unquestionably 
something that mirrors bitcoin. In its white paper, the creators write that Te-
zos is “a self-amending crypto-ledger,” and they show numerous lines of 
code that describe how the token functions.167 Because of this language, in-
vestors can reasonably expect that the “efforts of others” prong will eventual-
ly be unnecessary.168 Tezos is legitimately furthering technological innova-
tion. And in that view, the token would not satisfy prong four of the Howey
test at a certain point of development. Cloudtoken, likewise, may also not 
satisfy the fourth prong at some point, but that would occur later on in de-
velopment than in Tezos. The conclusion is that Tezos would be able to sell 
tokens without registering them with the SEC earlier in its lifetime than 
Cloudtokens could.
Each of these tokens, from Bananacoin to Tezos, would have the burden 
of showing in their white paper or other releases that they either provide 
enough utility or that they will become self-governing. Under this standard, 
Bananacoin would be preempted from using an ICO to sell a security outside 
the reach of SEC regulation. Tezos, by contrast, would not be overly bur-
dened by the SEC regulatory requirements because CFTC regulations would 
be more appropriate. The rationale is that if the tokens provide utility, they 
are products (a commodity); if they are self-governing, there are no manage-
rial efforts. Comparing these white papers is indicative: Bananacoin hardly 
mentions why it needs a blockchain or how its blockchain works, while Te-
zos is technologically savvy and explains how and why their blockchain is 
useful.169 There are strong benefits to all stakeholders: technological innova-
tors can create with reduced regulatory hurdles; regulators can more nar-
rowly differentiate between cryptocurrency ventures; and financial market 
way? A Few Theories, Opinion, Bloomberg (Oct. 17, 2017, 11:35 AM), https://
www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-10-17/what-is-an-ico-anyway-a-few-theories [https://
perma.cc/B5RH-N337]. This tracks the argument above: once cloud tokens are actually func-
tional, they may provide enough utility to escape prong one of Howey. To escape prong four, 
the SEC might ask whether the managers of the Cloudtoken will ever be eliminated: can it be 
fully self-governing?
167. Goodman, supra note 163. The creators also write, “Most importantly, Tezos sup-
ports meta upgrades: the protocols can evolve by amending their own code. To achieve this, 
Tezos begins with a seed protocol defining a procedure for stakeholders to approve amend-
ments to the protocol,” id. at 1, which suggests that users can interact with the platform with-
out involvement from Tezos creators, bolstering the argument that it intends to be free of 
management at some time.
168. See, e.g., SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946).
169. Compare Bananacoin, supra note 159, with Cloud, supra note 163 (“1. The basic 
building block of the decentralized cloud platform is a GridNode component, providing the 
basic cloud platform service blocks. 2. The GridNodes are interconnected to form a mesh net-
work for service management and request routing. Each GridNode is connected to the block-
chain.”).
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participants can have continued faith in the integrity of the financial markets 
at large. 
Conclusion
The reasoning behind Howey opens the door for more lenient regula-
tions on cryptocurrencies by treating them as commodities instead of securi-
ties. The fourth prong of Howey, “from the efforts of others,” implicitly 
means the self-serving efforts of managers based on prevailing case law.170
This allows some cryptocurrencies to escape securities regulation and in-
stead be classified as commodities. The cryptocurrencies that should be de-
veloped will inevitably be fully decentralized to realize the full potential of 
the blockchain. Managers working to automate themselves out of the picture 
are thus not the entrepreneurs that Howey is intending to bring within the 
definition of a security. Framing the “from the efforts of others” inquiry to 
include managers that automate themselves out effectively asks the question, 
“How essential is the blockchain to your enterprise?” Thus, tokens that are 
more like bitcoin should be less likely to be considered securities, but in-
stead, commodities subject to regulation by the CFTC; tokens that do not 
rely in a substantial way on the blockchain will be securities subject to regu-
lation by the SEC. 
This solution mitigates the uncertainty created by a blurred line between 
commodity and security introduced by cryptocurrency by clarifying when a 
token would become a commodity (i.e., when it becomes self-governing). 
Cryptocurrencies introduce even more questions about consistency between 
the two separate regulatory agencies and the fundamental question of 
whether something can switch between the two. The proposed solution of-
fers a consistent principle that the SEC and CFTC can use in the absence of 
judicially created tests or legislation to minimize the burden of fact-specific 
inquiries and slightly clarify that dynamic line between commodity and se-
curity. Critically, this solution does not require legislative intervention or 
even notice-and-comment rulemaking by the SEC and the CFTC. Instead, it 
is a plausible and practical application of existing Supreme Court precedent 
to a technological innovation beyond anything imaginable by Congress in
the 1930s.
170. See Howey, 328 U.S. at 299; SEC v. R.G. Reynolds Enters., 952 F.2d 1125 (9th Cir. 
1991); SEC v. Belmont Reid & Co., 794 F.2d 1388 (9th Cir. 1986); Noa v. Key Futures, Inc., 638 
F.2d 77 (9th Cir. 1980).
